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Bringing the Sultan Back In: 
Elders as Peacemakers in Ethiopia’s Somali Region 




In many African societies, elders play a crucial role in managing public affairs in their 
community, both with and in the absence of formal state recognition. Elders assume the most 
varied tasks in safeguarding the social, political, economic, cultural, religious and spiritual 
welfare of the people they (claim to) represent. Yet if we are to believe van Nieuwaal and van 
Dijk (1999: 9) “there is one aspect of chiefing for which no shortcuts exist”, and that is 
conflict resolution. Resolving conflicts represents a “chiefing” activity of special importance 
and interest for the study of recent waves of the incorporation of traditional authorities by 
Sub-Saharan African states. On the one hand, many rural societies lack a complete 
understanding of formal state institutions such as courts and legal codes, mainly preferring 
“endogenously defined concepts and procedures” (Just 1998: 108) to manage individual and 
communal disputes. On the other hand, the state endeavors “to dominate other institutions that 
provide dispute resolution services” (Merry 1987: 2069) in an attempt to subordinate 
competing norms that challenge its legitimacy. Controlling and ending violence is among the 
classic tasks of the nation state seeking to impose a monopoly over the use of legitimate force 
(Weber 1947).  
 
The tension between these two positions is familiar to most rural Somalis who engage in 
nomadic pastoralism and agro-pastoralism. Many Somalis believe in the “inherent fairness” 
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(Bihi 2000: 33) of Somali customary law (xeer), which their elders enact and interpret, and 
which regulates interactions between clan lineages. At the same time, state administrations 
unsuccessfully tried to expand and popularize modern state law among their Somali citizens 
in the past. In all Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa, whether belonging to the 
“failed state” of Somalia (including Somaliland and Puntland) or to internationally recognized 
entities like Djibouti, Kenya or Ethiopia, the state’s presence remains weak and sporadic, 
often having little legitimacy in the eyes of local communities. Peacemaking and reconciling 
clan groups are among the core activities of Somali elders. Conflict resolution on the basis of 
blood compensation (diya in Arabic, mag in Somali) is widely practiced wherever Somalis 
live.  
 
Yet, their local conflict-resolution systems have to date evaded systematic description 
(Gardner and El Bushra 2004: 166). This observation fits the general pattern of the neglect of 
data on peacemaking procedures in tribal societies (Goldschmidt 1994). Conflict resolution in 
the Somali region of Ethiopia provides an interesting showcase of how state and clan leaders 
formalize rules in what Ensminger (1990: 662) has called the “peripheral and least developed 
areas that only minimally recognize state authority and jurisdiction.” In this article, I therefore 
examine how the Ethiopian state co-opts and relies on traditional authorities to settle, manage 
and resolve communal conflicts within its Somali Regional State (or Somali region), more 
commonly known as Ogaden.1
 
 
In 2000, the Somali region appointed clan elders as the official counterparts of its district and 
regional authorities. The recognition and formalization of Somali elders selected by the 
Ethiopian government is a contemporary form of state-sponsored “traditionalisation” (Benda-
Beckmann et al. 2003). Known in Somali as guurti (council of elders) or lataliye (advisor), or 
as amakari in Amharic (advisor),2 the incorporation of these traditional leaders into the 
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regional government represents a noteworthy development within Ethiopia’s post-1991 
version of “ethnic federalism” (Aalen 2002; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003; Turton 2006). The 
implications of the participation of Somali (and other pastoral groups’) elders in decentralized 
government under the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
have not yet been subjected to academic scrutiny. Contrary to what one might assume, the 
guurti elders represent a parallel, not a hierarchically inferior structure to Somali region’s 
existing administrative levels, the region, the zone and the district. The establishment of 
stratified layers of guurti elders corresponds to a remodeling of Somali customary authority 
on the basis of the state’s policy of decentralized administration and the principle of ethnically 
based representation within the federal Ethiopian state. 
 
This article examines the interactions between customary and state authorities in the Somali 
Regional State in Ethiopia, focusing on the elders’ involvement in local conflict resolution. 
Salaried elders advise the local government in matters of peace and security and assist in 
mediating violent clan conflicts. A detailed empirical analysis of the consecutive steps of 
peacemaking demonstrates that guurti members, state officials and clan elders closely 
collaborate in containing, settling and resolving inter-group conflicts. The article concludes 
that the guurti elders play a vital but not uncontested role in a peacemaking process 
characterized by strong syncretism. Although the state codifies the outcomes of blood 
compensation agreements (diya), customary clan agreements (xeer) remain flexible. 
Ultimately, the Ethiopian state has agreed to replace part of its constitutional order with 
Somali customary law in an attempt to uphold political stability within its troubled pastoral 
lowlands. 
 
The empirical data presented in this paper derive from open and semi-structured interviews 
conducted between May 2003 and July 2004 in Jijiga, Harshin, Godey, Qalafo, and other 
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localities within the Somali region.3 This paper is divided into four sections. The first section 
provides a brief introduction to the sociological and historic context of Somali elders and to 
the discursive and symbolic imaginary in which they are couched. In the second section I 
review the modalities and motifs of the recent incorporation of elders into local government 
within the Somali region in Ethiopia. Thirdly, I describe joint conflict settlement and 
resolution procedures by elders and district administrators as practiced throughout the Somali 
region. The last section concludes by discussing the impact of the state recognition of Somali 
clan elders on customary law. In addition, some of the contradictions inherent in the syncretic 
peacemaking practiced by guurti elders, other elders and state officials are highlighted.  
 
THE SOMALI ELDER AS PRACTICE AND RHETORIC 
If Bourdieu’s (1984: 144) casual yet appropriate dictum that “everyone is an elder or a 
youngster of someone” holds true, then both the phenomenon and the concept of the Somali 
elder deserve to be called into question. Menkhaus (2000: 186) rightly points out that “the 
social category of ‘elder’ is quite fluid, a source of considerable confusion for outsiders.” Part 
of this confusion is due to evolving and competing ideas of what represents legitimate 
authority within Somali society. Some of the major implicit assumptions about the concept of 
the Somali elder must therefore be dissected. A first ambiguity stems from the meaning of 
“elder” (sing. oday, pl. odayaal) itself. To quote Ahmed and Green (1999: 123) “not all old 
men are elders, nor are all elders aged.” Being old enough is thus neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for being recognized as a Somali elder: a number of distinct, and certainly 
also evolving, behavioral and sometimes genealogical characteristics are necessary.  
 
Somali society distinguishes itself from African and non-African societies by the fact that, in 
principle, every married man can speak on behalf of his diya-paying group, (primary) lineage 
group, clan or clan family (Lewis 1999: 132).. Representation is based on what many authors 
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describe as an egalitarian mode of Somalis’ “pastoral democracy.”4 According to the 
dominant Somali cultural ideal, every man participates in decision-making by taking part in 
the shir, an ad hoc assembly that decides all important public matters, which Lewis (1999: 
198) describes as “the fundamental institution of [customary] government.” A second 
implication underlying the concept of the Somali elder is the fact that Somali elders are 
always men, never women. The idea of a Somali “pastoral democracy” enacted by wise old 
men corresponds to a purely patriarchal definition of democracy in which women play a 
subordinate role in all public affairs. As Glascock (1986: 56) unambiguously points out, 
“Males are the dominant sex in Somalia.” Curiously, while post-structuralist scholars of 
Somali studies have challenged the egalitarian myth of Lewis’s “pastoral democracy” by 
highlighting the social and economic stratification of Somali society (Besteman 1998), with 
the notable exception of Kapteijns (1995), Somali scholarship remains rather gender-blind. 
Undoubtedly, the concept of the Somali elder reflects a social imaginary in which the old 
dominate the young (gerontocracy) and men dominate women (patriarchy). 
 
While all aged men are elders, some individuals distinguish themselves and gain prominence 
as “effective negotiators, trusted mediators, moving orators, or wise and pious men” 
(Menkhaus 2000: 185-86) – the people that the folk notion of clan elders refers to. In most 
cases their authority is not based on hereditary status, but derived from the respect and 
recognition of their kin as “their elders”.5 Important attributes associated with Somali elders 
are “experience, age, oratory skills, fairness and impartiality, ability to compromise and 
persuade expertise in xeer and religious knowledge” (Ahmed 2001: 7). Glascock (1986) also 
stresses the importance of wisdom as a trait that Somalis closely associate with age and 
respectful behavior.  
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The institution of the Somali elder must be understood in relation to the two basic principles 
of Somali society, kinship (tol) and contract (xeer). Somali society is composed of segments 
such as clan families, clans, sub-clans and so on, defined through actual and fictitious descent 
in the patriline. The diya-paying group (jilib) represents the most stable political and social 
unit within Somali society, and its members are bound to diya-paying groups of other lineage 
groups through contractual agreements (xeer). Xeer embraces both the general concept of 
customary law as well as specific oral treaties between distinct lineage groups (xeer Isse, xeer 
Ogaadeen etc.). As a customary type of common law, xeer “is not static and [is] constantly 
being revised in the light of new conditions” (Lewis 1999: 175). Membership in a diya-paying 
group and xeer thus provide Somalis with the type of collective security that neither the 
colonial nor the post-colonial state were able to generate.6 
 
The role of Somali elders as custodians of the welfare of their kin has attracted controversy. 
With the advent of “participatory development” as the dominant legitimate mode of 
international aid, and following the collapse of the Siyaad Barre government in 1991, Somali 
elders have been increasingly lauded as legitimate and responsive community representatives, 
being reified too as benevolent sages and peacemakers partly as a consequence of the civil 
war. They were often opposed to a young generation of militia fighters accused of having 
created havoc in the country. Paying tribute to the role of Somali elders has become a 
standard practice of both Somali and foreign development agencies, politicians and even rebel 
groups. Yet not all commentators uncritically reproduce the idea of disinterested elders 
working exclusively for the common good.  
 
The fact that Somali elders are instrumental not only in making peace but also war is a 
commonplace that is often ignored, as it upsets the idyllic, state-propagated image of the 
nabadoon (peace-searcher).7 In his analysis of local governance in northeastern Somalia, Bihi 
 7 
(2000: 31) points out that “the alternation of so many elders between roles of warmonger 
(raising funds, recruiting fighters etc.) and peacemakers engendered deep cynicism within the 
public, many of whom decried elders as opportunists.” Other authors have rebutted the idea of 
elders’ altruism in resolving conflicts on the basis of blood compensation by pointing out their 
vested interest in collecting large amounts of diya (Gardner and El Bushra 2004: 79). Marchal 
(1998: 4) has expressed skepticism about foreign and local actors’ “emphasis on the neo-
traditional xeer”, while concurrently “few people dare to raise controversial issues linked to 
the xeer and to the effectiveness of such governance.” Drawing on first-hand experience in 
Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region, Marchal (1998: 4) describes local elders as “accused to 
have stirred up conflicts in order to get a share of the diya,” of corruption, “missing the basic 
education to fulfill their current responsibilities,” and marginalizing young people and the 
educated in their society.  
 
Colonial and post-colonial efforts to incorporate Somali elders into local administration and to 
curb or accommodate the customary xeer produced varied results. The British protectorate in 
the north tried to co-opt Somali elders by creating titular elders known as caqil (pl. cuqaal), 
who after 1921 acted as a link between the district administration and the protectorate’s 
inhabitants. In the Italian Somali colony in the south, similar efforts were made to nominate 
loyal elders as capos (Lewis 2002). In legal respects, both the Italian colony and the British 
protectorate followed a “middle course” by introducing Western criminal law (the Indian 
Penal Code for British Somaliland and the Italian Penal Code in Italian Somalia), but the diya 
blood compensation was also partially incorporated into the administration of justice (Contini 
1971: 79-80). Imperial Ethiopian rulers in the Ogaden proceeded in a similar manner. By the 
1930s, Darood Somali chiefs and clan notables from the Ogaden “were taken to Addis Ababa 
to express their loyalty to the Emperor” (Barnes 2000: 146). During the British interim rule 
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over the Ogaden (1941-1948), the customary xeer of the Darood clan lineages was legally 
recognised by the colonial administration (Seid and Jotte 2004). 
 
Following Somalia’s independence in 1960, the country’s first government promoted a 
process of national modernization that had no place for customary institutions. After Siyaad 
Barre came to power in 1969 and established scientific socialism, all tribal names and 
allegiances were officially abolished (Lewis 2002). Yet despite the Somali government’s 
explicit policy of eradicating “tribalism,” the payment of blood compensation “was found to 
be compatible with the constitutional provision that penal liability shall be personal” (Contini 
1971: 83). In neighboring Ethiopia the Dergue’s rule (1974-1991) over the Ogaden was 
primarily based on military coercion vis-à-vis those Somalis who had not fled the region 
following the 1977-78 Ethiopian-Somali war. By the time of Siyaad Barre’s downfall, Somali 
elders were already following different trajectories. Some “became tainted as ‘stooges’ of the 
military regime,” others preserved a degree of integrity, and “the majority of elders hovered 
between the government and their communities, attempting to placate the government and 
promote the interest of their people” (Bihi 2000: 30).  
 
International humanitarian intervention in Somalia at the beginning of the 1990s sought to re-
establish a central government primarily through a top-down approach involving the warlords 
and faction leaders, but it failed to produce the desired effects. This was followed by the 
United Nations half-hearted, more bottom-up approach to peace- and state-building in 
Somalia. According to this “building block approach” (Bryden 1999), the future Somali state 
was to be reconstructed on the basis of different pre-existing regional administrations. If they 
proved capable of providing governance and security at the local level, regional 
administrations such as those of Somaliland and Puntland would then become the building 
blocks of a new central government. But the international community largely failed to involve 
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respected elders and community leaders in local and regional peace initiatives in connection 
with this process. In the absence of a central state and significant international assistance, 
indigenous peace-building efforts and institution-building by Somali clan elders became 
instrumental in resolving conflicts and maintaining security within the context of radically 
decentralized governance in Somalia (Farah and Lewis 1997; Hoehne 2002; Menkhaus 2000). 
 
THE (S)ELECTION OF GUURTI ELDERS  
What were the motivations of the Ethiopian government in “bringing the sultan back in” to 
govern the Somali region?8 Why and how did the government institutionalize “traditional” 
authority within the Somali region? At a structural level, and as part of a long historical 
process, the federal government is seeking to increase its control over its pastoral periphery. 
This particularly applies to the Ogaden, where many Somalis contest Ethiopian rule 
(Hagmann and Khalif 2005). Ethiopia’s fear of a revived secessionist movement and security 
concerns related to armed groups, including Islamic militants Al-Itihad (Tadesse 2002), make 
the Somali region a geopolitically sensitive territory. Therefore, the Ethiopian government has 
a vital interest in expanding state control over its portion of Somali territory. At the more 
cyclical level, the establishment of the guurti occurred shortly before the 2000 national and 
regional elections. The guurti elders were instrumental in securing a sweeping electoral 
victory for the ruling Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP). Additionally, the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF), which had “taken to the bush” after its falling out with the 
EPRDF in 1994, continued to confront the federal army militarily within the Somali region. 
Although formally unrelated, the creation of the guurti must also be viewed as an attempt by 
the government to contain the ONLF. 
 
The guurti system of the Somali region had initially been proposed by the federal government 
in 1998, but was delayed due to dissent within the regional parliament.9 The actual creation of 
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the guurti in 2000 was the result of a string of careful appointments by the regional 
government, which made the process more a matter of selection than of election. This 
(s)election took place in two consecutive rounds, first at the regional and zonal levels at the 
end of 1999, and later at the district level at the beginning of 2000.10 In November 1999, an 
“enclave of seven hundred of the most prominent clan elders and ugaasyo (sing. ugaas)” from 
the Somali region (Donovan and Regasse 2001: 13) elected the guurti elders at regional and 
zonal levels for a five-year term of office. The meeting and its procedure had been jointly 
organized and planned by the federal and regional authorities.11  
 
To begin with, the elders were asked to nominate an organizing committee, which was given 
the task of defining the modalities of the new guurti system. The committee proposed that the 
regional guurti, as the highest body within the government-recognized elders’ hierarchy, 
should be composed of thirty members. Seventy elders should represent the region’s nine 
zones, and each of the region’s then 48 districts was supposed to (s)elect three guurti elders. 
Participants agreed to this proposal, and after a brief presentation of the candidates, approved 
the nomination of one hundred guurti elders at the regional (30) and zonal (70) levels. After 
approval of his candidature, each guurti elder was asked to swear on the Koran “that he will 
represent the community as a whole, not his clan” (Donovan and Regasse 2001: 13). Meetings 
were then held to (s)elect three guurti elders in each of the districts at the beginning of 2000. 
Donovan and Regasse (2001: 30) have suggested that,  
 
Although there was no criteria that one has to meet to be elected as a member to the 
institution of the guurti, the following were agreed to be factors considered in the 
election: 1. Not being a member of groups opposing the government; 2. being free from 
clannism and favoritism; 3. having a reputation in the community; 4. integrity; and 5. 
knowledge of traditional law and Islam with the ability of self-expression. 
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These (s)election criteria are also mentioned by Abraham et al. (2002: 30), who state in 
addition that, “according to our key informants, these include integrity, conviction, 
articulation, good reputation in the community, being free from clannish attitude, respect for 
government rules and regulations, personality and leadership quality, etc.” In some districts 
inhabited by different clans or clan families, the numerically larger lineage groups excluded 
smaller onesby nominating all guurti elders from their own number. 
 
Since their inauguration, guurti elders receive the same salary as the civil servants in the 
district, zonal and regional administrations. Zonal and regional guurti elders receive their 
salaries from the regional finance bureau, while district (woreda) guurti elders are directly 
paid by the district finance bureau. District guurti members earn 609 Ethiopian Birr (ETB), 
zonal guurti members 940 ETB and regional guurti members 1,600 ETB respectively 
(Donovan and Regasse 2001: 31).12 A formal mandate or “job description” for guurti elders 
does not exist. Article 56 of the revised Somali Regional State Constitution (SRS 2002) on the 
“Establishment of the Elders’ and Clan Leaders’ Council” provides the constitutional basis for 
the establishment of the government-recognized elders’ council.13  
 
Yet no corresponding proclamation enacting and implementing this constitutional provision 
has been decreed so far by the regional parliament. In the absence of a proclamation, the 
guurti elders’ terms of reference and the procedures for dismissing and (re)electing them 
remain open to interpretation. The minimum common denominator of what guurti elders’ 
tasks consist of has been summarized as “advising the administrators, serving as mediators 
between the government administrators and the local communities, controlling and resolving 
major conflicts among communities in the area, and monitoring emergency operation 
programs (such as food distribution)” (Donovan and Regasse 2001: 31). All sources agree that 
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advising government officials in matters of peace and security represents the main task of a 
guurti elder. Other duties include “resolving problems or conflict between communities and 
the government”, to “act as a link between government and local communities” and to “act as 
informers of the government and disseminate government policy.”14 The salaried elders even 
participate in politico-administrative evaluation sessions known as gem gema, which act as an 
instrument to control and discipline government and party members at all administrative 
levels (see Aalen 2002 for Ethiopia, Hagmann 2005 for the Somali region). The fact that 
guurti elders are included in gem gema indicates the federal authorities’ strategy of 
counterbalancing regional and local administration in the Somali region with a government-
controlled system of elders.  
 
The opinions of Ethiopian Somalis as well as outsiders about the legitimacy and autonomy of 
the guurti elders vary greatly. Lister (2004), Abraham et al. (2000) and my own observations 
in the following section suggest that the setting up of the guurti as a parallel pillar of 
governance within the Somali region has been quite effective in containing and resolving 
communal conflicts, especially those driven by competition over natural resources. The 
legitimacy of the guurti as a state-promoted customary institution is another story altogether. 
Elders have been criticized for “being in the pay of the government” and “being divorced 
from their communities they claimed to represent” (Lister 2004: 26). Gedi (2005: 60) 
mentions how some guurti elders have been given derogatory names such as “long-tongued 
impostor” (afmiishaar). One Ethiopian-Somali intellectual explained the lack of popular 
legitimacy of the guurti elders as follows:  
 
The government on the basis of their loyalty to the government selects them. Then [a] 
major cleavage emerged between the existing elders and the newly established guurti. 
The government seeks the support of the guurti to have some propaganda of 
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participating the civil society [sic], while it is the other elders who effectively control 
the clan men.15 
 
Undoubtedly, the institutionalization of the guurti has exacerbated competition over 
community representation between “government elders” and “non-government elders” within 
the Somali region. Directly related to the contested legitimacy of the guurti is the question of 
their autonomy vis-à-vis the government and party structure. Lister (2004: 26-27) has 
illustrated how many government elders “openly worked” for the SPDP and were 
instrumental in campaigning for the ruling EPRDF-friendly party by exerting influence on 
communities’ voting habits. In view of the region’s neo-patrimonial politics (Hagmann 2005), 
the assumption of elders that material and political benefits can only be obtained within the 
ruling party structure seems accurate. 
 
“CUSTOMS IN ACTION”: ELDERS AS PEACEMAKERS 
This section describes in detail the roles and actions of elders, guurti elders and state officials 
in containing, settling and resolving violent clan conflicts. Communal inter-group conflicts 
within the Somali region are recurrent and mostly undocumented. An exception is the 2004 
compilation of casualty figures by regional guurti elders, who calculated a combined death 
toll of over seven hundred from different violent clan conflicts within eleven of the region’s 
districts (SRS 2004). The EPRDF’s propagation of decentralized administration within 
Ethiopia resulted in the drawing up of districts and kebeles within the Somali region and their 
assignment to particular lineage groups and clans.16 Consequently, violent disputes motivated 
by territorial control rather than actual resource use have become prevalent since 1991 (see 
Shide 2005). Elders play a prominent role in mediating both non-violent and violent disputes.  
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Conflicts between individuals are usually contained, adjudicated and settled by the agnatic 
male relatives of the disputants. Resolving minor disputes usually does not require the 
involvement of a third clan elder. If a dispute cannot be settled amicably or if the parties to 
the conflict do not accept the ruling of their elders, they may bring their case before the courts 
(legal or sharia) in their respective district capital. In reality litigants rarely refer to the formal 
justice system to settle disputes, This avoidance of the state’s legal system can be illustrated 
by the following example: out of a total of two hundred and fifteen criminal cases (homicide, 
attempted murder, armed robbery) observed in 2002 in the Korahe zone of the Somali region, 
only six were dealt with by the courts (Seid and Jotte 2004: 12). The following description of 
successive steps of peacemaking by district guurti elders, other elders, district administration 
and security forces is originally based on material I collected in the Harshin woreda of the 
Jijiga zone.  
 
Due to the uncontrolled enclosure of land in Harshin, tensions over land-ownership among the 
local Habr Awal (Isaaq) lineage groups and clans have repeatedly escalated into violent 
conflicts in the past one and a half decades, claiming about one hundred and forty lives 
between 1991 and 2003. The conflict management procedure I describe on the basis of the 
Harshin case study has been confirmed for other parts of the Somali region, such as Qualafo 
district in Godey zone (author’s field research 2004), and Donovan and Regasse (2001) report 
an identical sequence of conflict management for Dollo Ado district in Liban zone. Making 
peace in the Somali context involves consecutive phases, starting from the cessation of 
hostilities to the fulfillment of preconditions for negotiations, actual bargaining over the diya 




Upon receiving information about a violent incident (shootings, killings etc.), the district 
administration and guurti elders mobilize all the security forces, including the district militia, 
police, and sometimes federal soldiers, and appropriate all locally available vehicles.18 Jointly 
they rush to the conflict site, sometimes carrying white flags. Time is of the essence, as 
tensions can quickly escalate into full-blown fighting if both parties to the conflict mobilize 
their clansmen. Upon arrival at the conflict site, the intervention team positions itself between 
the two warring parties, who are told to retreat. The security forces are instructed to disarm 
the men from both sides and to confiscate their guns. At this point the fighters usually retreat, 
as they are afraid of losing their weapons. In an initial step to calm the situation, the district 
administration and guurti elders summon elders from the two fighting clans, who are warned 
that whoever violates the ceasefire or enters the “demilitarized” zone will be “dealt with” by 
the government. In cases where people have been killed, the district administration removes 
the perpetrator’s family from the conflict site in order to avoid direct contact between the 
perpetrator’s and victim’s relatives. After physically separating the parties to the conflict and 
ending the immediate violence, the district administrators, in collaboration with the guurti 
elders, designate an odd number of elders (usually seven or nine) belonging to a third clan, i.e. 
a lineage group that did not participate in the dispute. 
 
The mandate of these mediating elders is to reach a negotiated agreement on diya payments 
between the disputing clans. These mediating elders include members of the guurti who 
belong genealogically to a third-party clan. One precondition for engaging in negotiations 
over the blood money is the identification and arrest of the killer(s) so that the victim’s clan 
members may refrain from revenge and instead engage in negotiations that will eventually 
make them forgive the perpetrator(s).19 District officials face the challenge of apprehending 
the killer(s) and the gun(s) that are requested by the aggrieved party. Often the local 
government is not in a position to catch the killer(s) by force as it lacks the coercive means 
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(transport, police etc.) and military strength (being outnumbered by the fighting clans) to do 
so. Consequently, the district officials arrest close agnatic relatives, for instance the father(s) 
of the killer(s) in order to pressurize the relatives into handing over the perpetrator(s) to the 
mediating elders. 
 
After apprehending the perpetrator, the mediating elders commence with the actual 
negotiations of the blood money. Each side chooses an equal number of elders to represent 
them, usually between five and ten. The negotiations take place between these three groups of 
elders: the mediating elders and the two groups of elders representing the parties to the 
conflict. Both sides present their complaints to the mediators in the presence of the other clan. 
The mediating elders then reach their final decisions in seclusion. Negotiation of the amount 
and timing of the diya lies at the centre of what Somalis consider “conflict resolution” in 
cases of inter-clan conflict. As a general rate the homicide of a man is compensated with one 
hundred camels, of a woman with fifty camels or cash of equivalent value.  
 
The ratio of hundred:fifty camels constitutes the standard amount for diya in the Somali-
inhabited territories (Lewis 1999). A number of other wrongdoings are partly or fully 
compensated with cash. People injured in fighting are entitled to obtain diya, and their case is 
included in the negotiations. The amount of diya depends on the gravity of the injuries as 
decided by elders knowledgeable in sharia law. Wounds are mostly compensated in cash, 
though often only half the total amount of diya provided for to compensate for wounds is paid 
to the victim. After the district administrators and guurti elders have brought open hostilities 
to a halt, the perpetrator’s relatives have to hand over one thousand five hundred ETB to the 
injured person(s) to cover expenses for medical treatment.20 
 
 17 
Special circumstances and motives of the killing are taken into account in determining the 
total amount of diya. Blood compensation can increase up to one hundred and fifty or one 
hundred and eighty camels if someone is killed unexpectedly (while sleeping or traveling) or 
in a very brutal and inhumane manner. Conversely, the amount of blood money will decrease 
if, for example, the two lineage groups involved had agreed in the past that less than one 
hundred camels would be suffice to compensate a murder. Existing contractual agreements 
between different lineage groups are taken into consideration in each negotiation. One can 
thus speak of a body of customary rules that are interpreted and reinterpreted through each 
new conflict and case of mediation. The camels and cash that comprise the diya are presented 
to the victim’s diya-paying group. Approximately half of it is given to the next of kin of the 
victim and the other half distributed among the members of the entire diya-paying group.21 
The major task of the mediating elders is to determine the time schedule and the amount of 
diya, which is usually paid in three consecutive installments.  
 
The first installment is known as axan (camel slaughtered at a funeral) and kafan (white 
garment used to cover the corpse before burial). For axan and kafan the killer presents his gun 
and three thousand ETB to the victim’s clansmen, the latter being intended to cover the 
funeral expenses. It is only after axan and kafan have been paid that the amount of diya will 
be decided by the parties to the conflict and the mediators. Usually within five to twenty days, 
the second installment of blood compensation, known as rafiso, has to be given to the 
victim’s immediate kin. In the case of the Habr Awal lineage groups inhabiting Harshin 
district, the rafiso currently consists of twenty to thirty young camels of less than five years of 
age and in good physical condition.22 Finally, the third and last installment of blood money, 
called mag dheer (the long or tall diya), is paid within two to four months of reaching the 
original blood compensation agreement. The animals given as mag dheer are usually weaker 
and older than those paid for rafiso. 
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The mediating third-clan elders and district officials remain at the conflict site until the rafiso 
is completed. During this period, the killer’s clan relatives have to provide food, including 
qaad, and accommodation to the elders and officials, expenses that are known as siifad. 
Although not formally part of the diya, they are indirectly part of the compensation, as the 
siifad often becomes a real financial burden for the killer’s family. The guurti and mediating 
elders also determine the sanctions to be imposed in any case of non-compliance by the 
conflicting clans with the blood compensation agreement. Penalties take the form of financial 
sanctions in the range of five thousand to twenty thousand ETB. In cases of highly aggravated 
clan conflicts with numerous casualties the mediating elders might encourage the victim’s 
clan to accept a young girl from the killer’s clan as part of the reconciliation process (godob 
reeb), in which case the total amount of diya to be paid will be reduced. Furthermore, the 
mediation between the clans is accompanied by prayers and, upon successful reconciliation, 
by the slaughtering of animals for joint consumption by the clan elders. 
 
The mediating elders and district administrators document the conflict resolution process in 
two written agreements that bind the conflicting clans to the agreement reached. The first 
document relates to the decisions of the mediating elders’ committee. It is addressed to the 
two disputing clans, and a copy of it is sent to the zonal administration. The letter briefly 
describes the conflict, lists the amount of and deadlines for the diya installments, and lays 
down a fine for non-compliance. It is signed by the mediating elders and three district 
officials. The second document spells out the agreement reached between the elders of the 
two disputing clans. In this letter, the parties to the conflict vow to accept the decision of the 
mediating elders, which has been approved by the district administration. The disputants 
commit themselves to peace and accept the proposed fine. Finally, the document again lists 
the installments and conditions of the diya payments. This second document is signed by the 
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elders of the two conflicting clans, who thereby consent to abide to the agreement reached by 
the mediators.  
 
This portrayal of a sequence of joint peace-making steps by the guurti, other elders and local 
government officials does not imply that these steps are uncontested, evolve linearly or 
always successful – the contrary is the case. Often mediators and government officials are 
able to contain violence and to engage disputants in some kind of agreement on diya payment, 
usually by threatening a recourse to coercive state measures. However, such agreements do 
not automatically translate into implementation, and in protracted clan conflicts especially, 
diya remains unpaid and the local government is unable, and sometimes also unwilling, to 
resolve the conflict. Revenge killings during negotiations may considerably disturb the 
mediation process. Such killings indicate that some factions within the disputing lineage 
groups are more interested in direct confrontation than in settling the issue. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As the above description demonstrates, district authorities and elders closely collaborate in 
resolving local-level clan conflicts in Ethiopia’s Somali region. The salaried guurti elders 
embody a vital link between the state and traditional forms of authority in a syncretic 
peacemaking approach that merges the xeer with state coercion and diya compensation with 
administrative sanctions. A key question is whether the recognition of traditional authorities 
and laws by the state “freezes” the customary system’s inherent flexibility (Benda-Beckmann 
2003: 302). In other words, did the setting up of guurti in the Somali region “freeze” the 
authority of the elders, the xeer and diya-based blood-compensation system?  
 
The question is not easy to answer straightforwardly due to the inherent ambivalence of the 
guurti system. On the one hand, district officials codify the contractual agreements negotiated 
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between the clan elders. However, the state does not record these agreements in an 
unchangeable manner, as only the conflict resolution outcomes, not the procedure itself, are 
codified. The key feature of the xeer is its common law character, which provides for highly 
differentiated and contextualized legal solutions. Somalis perceive the xeer as legitimate not 
only because it provides material and political security, but also because it is constantly (re-
)negotiated to fit the demands of the parties and local circumstances. As long as the state 
documents and sanctions the diya modalities on a case-by-case basis, the flexibility and 
credibility of the xeer are maintained. The “freezing” and manipulation of the customary 
norms would only occur if the government were to universalize particular blood 
compensation agreements for the whole of the Somali region, irrespective of existing local 
inter- and intra-clan contracts, or if it were to impose the guurti elders as the exclusive 
mediators of clan conflicts. 
 
Despite the setting up of the guurti and the important role they play in bridging the gap 
between the state and customary norms, the flexibility of the xeer has survived so far. This is 
undoubtedly because conflict resolution by blood compensation enjoys great legitimacy 
among Somalis, including those in Ethiopia. Seid and Jotte (2004: 33) rightly point out that 
the xeer “has a moral force, hence it is accepted by all the parties in most of the cases.” Thus 
any elder who has knowledge of xeer, negotiation skills and a record of being a neutral 
mediator will be respected, regardless of his relationship to the government. That said, 
peacemaking by elders and state officials is accompanied by a number of contradictions 
inherent in the amalgam of customary and state conflict resolution. One contradiction relates 
to the way in which the state rationalizes the incorporation of the guurti into local 
government. On the one hand the guurti are rhetorically presented as traditional authorities 
representing “community”, not narrow genealogical interests. One of the official (s)election 
criteria to become a guurti elder is the lack of a “clannish” attitude. However, in reality elders 
 21 
are recognized by the government precisely because they personify the interests of their 
respective lineage groups or clans and because they are capable of mobilizing political 
support for government policy among their kin. 
 
A second contradiction derives from the state’s tacit agreement to settle criminal cases such as 
homicides outside its formal justice system. Involuntarily, regional and local administrations 
undermine state sovereignty by not only tolerating, but actively promoting the application of 
customary xeer to resolve clan conflicts. Although the Ethiopian federal constitution 
recognizes the adjudication of personal and family disputes on the basis of religious and 
customary law, criminal cases must be decided according to modern state law (FDRE 1995). 
However, in its Somali lowlands the Ethiopian state accepts the payment of blood money 
compensation negotiated by elders rather than individual punishment decided by its legal 
courts.  
 
A third contradiction concerns the state’s self-proclaimed agenda of democratizing Ethiopian 
society by guaranteeing the civic rights of its citizens while at the same time implementing 
customary norms that exclude participation by different social groups. In Somali custom, its 
interpretation and application, women and minority groups such as occupational castes 
(blacksmiths, leather-tanners etc.) are excluded from decision-making. The ultimate reason 
why the Ethiopian state agrees partly to replace its constitutional norms with Somali 
customary rules is its feeble legitimacy and very limited performance in terms of service 
delivery in the Somali region. Although the state is compromising its sovereignty by 
delegating some conflict-resolution and security functions to customary authorities such as 
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1 Conflict settlement is defined as “outcome-oriented strategies for achieving sustainable win-
win solutions and/or putting an end to ‘direct violence’” (Reimann 2001), while conflict 
resolution refers to “a process that transforms conflicts in an enduring manner rather than 
settling disputes…by addressing basic human needs and building…relationships” (Fisher 
1997: 268-69). I use the geographical terms “Somali region” and “Ogaden” interchangeably. 
To distinguish Ogaden as a geographical area from the clan, I use the Somali spelling 
Ogaadeen to refer to the latter. 
2 The term guurti (council of elders) projects a symbolically more powerful image than 
lataliye (advisor). While the first refers to wise and honored elders, the latter implies that the 
actions of these elders are conditional on government endorsement. 
3 Interviews with elders and local government officials concentrated on resource use and the 
management of violent conflicts over land and water. Informal focus group discussions were 
held in a number of “teashops.” More sensitive information pertaining to clan politics, intra-
clan conflict and conflict resolution procedures was collected through longer, open-ended 
conversations with elders and district administrators. These intense discussions usually 
involved the consumption of tea and qaad, a mildly narcotic leaf mostly chewed by Somali 
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men. The overwhelming majority of the interviews were conducted with middle-aged and 
older men, many of whom occupy a comparatively higher social status within their 
community. Due to culturally prescribed roles, access to and interaction with female Somalis 
is very difficult for male researchers. 
4 Lewis’s (1999) seminal study has greatly influenced the perception of Somali society as an 
egalitarian social body in which feud and violence are but a functional expression of 
segmentary kinship. 
5 Although a difference exists between titled (such as boqor, garad, sultan, ugas or isimo) and 
untitled elders, the legitimacy of an individual elder it not primarily determined by this factor. 
See Hoehne’s contribution in this volume. 
6 For a comprehensive discussion, see Lewis (1999). A more summary account of xeer is 
found in Menkhaus (2000). 
7 A title given to elders by the Siyaad Barre government in an attempt to depoliticize their 
role. 
8 A reference to Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985). 
9 The ruling SPDP had been established in 1998 as the successor to the Ethiopian Somali 
Democratic League (ESDL), which by 1998 was in a state of paralysis as a result of infighting 
and the imprisonment of some of its members on corruption charges. The outbreak of the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean border war (1998-2000) provides another explanation for the federal 
government’s delay in establishing the guurti in Somali region. 
10 I deliberately use the ambiguous term “(s)election” to refer to the nomination of the guurti 
elders. Several key informants used the term “selection” to describe the nomination of these 
elders, as well as candidates of the ruling SPDP. 
11 The Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFedA) is the central organ of the central government, 
responsible for overseeing politics, pastoral development and security in Ethiopia’s 
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“peripheral regions.” Its representatives maintain regular contacts with the region’s 
leadership. See Samatar (2004); Hagmann (2005). 
12 At the time of writing (2005), US$1 is exchanged for almost 9 ETB. 
13 “The State Council shall, in accordance with this constitution, establishes [sic] elders’ and 
clan leaders’ Council. Particulars shall be determined by law” (Art. 56). 
14 Interview with former zonal administrator, Jijiga, July 14, 2003. 
15 Personal communication, October 21, 2004. 
16 Kebeles are the lowest administrative level in Ethiopia, with a nominal existence in the 
sparsely inhabited pastoral lowlands. 
17 For comparative purposes, I refer to Ahmed (2001: 7-8) for an account of the successive 
phases and peacemaking modalities of Somaliland’s major post-1991 peace conferences, in 
which elders played a key role. 
18 The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has military camps in all of the region’s 
district capitals and reports directly to the federal government. Since the mid-1990s the 
federal army has been engaged in counter-insurgency operations against ONLF rebels. It only 
intervenes in cases of major clan conflicts that are perceived to threaten the security and 
power balance of the region. 
19 According to a strict interpretation of sharia law, the victim’s relatives have the moral right 
to kill the offender. This norm receives little acceptance among pastoralist Somalis, as it 
provides no material benefits for the victim’s relatives. 
20 Medical expenses are later deducted from the total blood compensation to be paid. 
21 The division of the compensation between the victim’s immediate family and his diya-
paying group also varies. For a different form of division, see Lewis (1999: 172). 
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22 Numerous variations apply in the determination of the age and condition of the livestock 
paid for compensation. For the Ogaadeen clans inhabiting Godey zone, the rafiso and mag 
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